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ABSTRACT
Capacity constraints have major effects on restaurant competition. 
This article captures the impact of capacity constraints on quality and 
quantity competition of restaurant industry by employing a two-stage 
asymmetric capacity constraints model. There are several findings 
from this study. First, results of this study indicate that reputation 
difference increases total outputs and quality in equilibrium. Second, 
capacity constraints decrease the consumer surplus (CS) as well as 
social welfare (SW), but restaurants benefit from capacity constraints 
sometimes. Third, capacity reduces both the quality and quantity 
of the competitor. Furthermore, restaurants raise their prices if 
consumers are quality-sensitive or lower the quality if consumers are 
price-sensitive under capacity constraints. Fourth, this study compares 
the total quality, CS, and SW under four cases: no restaurant faces 
constraints, small restaurant faces constraints, big restaurant faces 
constraints, and both small and big restaurants face constraints. The 
total quality investment, CS, and SW are highest if a small restaurant 
faces capacity constraints while the larger one does not.
1. Introduction
The concept of capacity constraints relates to the economy of scale. Several factors result in 
capacity constraints in a restaurant sector. First, a restaurant has a limited number of seats. 
Second, dinner time is restrictive which means customers only visit restaurants during a 
certain time. Third, chefs can only cook a limited number of food items during the dinner 
time. The restaurant sector is sufficiently similar to hotel and airline industries as all of 
them have limited capacity, or they operate with capacity constraints (Heo, Lee, Mattila, & 
Hu, 2013). Different from hotels and airlines; however, restaurant sector’s capacity is more 
flexible. Attributes such as location, ambiance, quality and waiting time of consumers, and 
capacity management are major components in the restaurant industry (Hwang, Gao, & 
Jang, 2010). Besides, service and food qualities determine the average meal price charged by 
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a restaurant (Yim, Lee, & Kim, 2014). Production and service’s quality of restaurant involve 
a significant topic, food safety, which is a major issue all over the world (Chen, Wen, Wang, 
& Nie, 2017). Therefore, the restaurant industry is unique, and capacity constraints have 
significant effects on restaurant operation.
Capacity constraints impact industrial competition structure; sometimes even improving 
the status of disadvantaged firms. For example, Chen, Nie, and Wang (2015) illustrated 
that capacity constraints offset the second-mover disadvantage of the follower under the 
Stackelberg competition. Interestingly, customers may experience the following phenomena 
in a restaurant business. The restaurant offers high-quality food items which are delicious 
at the beginning, but then the quality will deteriorate, or the price will go up some time 
later. A similar example can be found in the hospital and banking sectors, where the quality 
of service goes down if too many customers are waiting behind the yellow (waiting) line. 
Undoubtedly, all those behaviours are rational. A major reason for these phenomena is that 
firms are faced with capacity constraints. A restaurant has less incentive to offer high-quality 
good or service if the demand is more than the restaurant’s capacity. To increase profit, res-
taurants will reduce the quality if most of the customers are price-sensitive or increase the 
price if most of the customers are quality-sensitive when the demand exceeds its capacity. 
The major objectives of this study are to model restaurant behaviours and to illustrate why 
competition strategies are volatile, as well as to offer additional intuitions related to the 
capacity constraint. Additionally, this study will expand an asymmetric capacity constraints 
theory by employing an asymmetric capacity constraints competition model.
There are two kinds of capacity constraints: symmetrical and asymmetrical. Symmetrical 
capacity constraints mean all the firms in the industry are faced with the same capacity 
constraints. If different firms are faced with different capacity constraints, then it is asym-
metrical capacity constraints. Prior studies have employed symmetrical capacity constraints 
model, or firms of the same industry compete with the same capacity constraints (Chen 
et al., 2015; Esó, Nocke, & White, 2010; Lester, 2011; Nie & Chen, 2012). These studies are 
focused on input constraints, which mean the capacity constraints are decided by exter-
nal factors. Capacity constraints of restaurants are decided by internal factors. In other 
words, different restaurants have different or asymmetrical constraints. Different from the 
existing research, this article captures quality and quantity competition by adopting an 
asymmetrical capacity constraints model. Our results indicate that different restaurants 
implement different strategies under the condition of capacity constraints, which depend 
on the preferences of consumers.
Furthermore, this article investigates the relationship between reputation and quality and 
its effects on restaurants competition. Reputation is defined as ‘a perceptual representation 
of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to 
all of its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals’ (Fombrun, 1996). Roberts 
and Dowling (2002) illustrate that a good reputation is a valuable asset that allows a firm 
to achieve persistent profitability, or sustained superior financial performance. Good rep-
utation enables a firm to increase its prices or increase its sales. The results of this study 
show that reputation has a significant influence on restaurants competition and reputation 
difference increases total quality and quantity of the industry in equilibrium.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. A literature review is outlined in 
Section 2, a basic model setup is provided in Section 3, and several propositions are pre-
sented after the model section. Concluding remarks and some discussions are provided in 
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the final section of the article. All the proofs related to the propositions can be found in 
the appendix section.
2. Literature review
Capacity constraints have attracted much attention recently (e.g. Adilov, 2012; Chen et al., 
2015; Chun & Park, 2016; Klein & Kolb, 2015; Mayo & Sappington, 2016; Sena, 2006; van 
den Berg, Bos, Herings, & Peters, 2012; Whited, 2006). The existing literature on this topic 
can be classified into four categories: price competition, output competition, merger or 
collusion, and special industry.
Price and quality competitions are most familiar competition behaviour in industrial 
organisation. Many researchers have investigated the effects of capacity constraints on price 
competition. For example, Ishibashi (2008) has analysed collusive price equilibrium with 
capacity constraints and shown that capacity constraints heighten the collusive leadership 
price. He argues that a large firm has more incentive to participate in price collusion if it 
is confronted with capacity constraints. So, a large firm has an incentive to move early to 
demonstrate its price collusion commitment despite knowing that early price setting is 
a disadvantage to the firm. More interestingly, Arnold and Saliba (2011) imply capacity 
constraints yield price dispersion, and a higher capacity constrained firm charges a higher 
price, while a lower capacity constrained firm charges a lower price. Lester (2011) examines 
a standard consumer search model with capacity constraints. He comes to the conclusion 
that as buyers become more able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower 
prices. Equilibrium may not necessarily hold if a firm plays price competition games with 
capacity constraints. Moreover, Lester’s study shows that more information for consumers 
could lead to an increase in restaurant menu prices. Deng and Yano (2006) show that the 
firm with tight capacity constraints will adopt more aggressive pricing.
Some prior research focuses on the relationship between capacity constraints and output 
quantity. Nie and Chen (2012) investigate duopoly competition with input constraints. They 
declare that input constraints reduce market size difference and price difference. To obtain 
robust conclusions, they discuss their model under different conditions. Surprisingly, the 
firm-size difference and price difference decrease with total input under capacity constraints 
under the Stackelberg competition if the stronger firm plays as the leader, which is contrary 
to the results of the Cournot competition. Esó et al. (2010) captured the effects of capacity 
constraints on output by employing an upstream–downstream model. Esó et al. (2010) 
achieved the similar conclusions as Nie and Chen (2012), and they suggest that capacity 
constraints lead to industry symmetry. These studies imply that capacity constraints are 
beneficial to disadvantaged firms.
Parts of the existing studies highlight the effects of capacity constraints on other compe-
tition strategies such as merger and collusion. Based on scarce input that enhances product 
quality, Mayo and Sappington (2016) find that auctions will not always ensure the wel-
fare-maximising allocation of scarce inputs. Chen et al. (2015) highlight effects of capacity 
constraints on innovation competition. Nie (2014) captures effects of capacity constraints 
on mixed duopoly. Froeb, Tschantz, and Crooke (2003) study the impacts of mergers among 
firms facing capacity constraints. Their study indicates that capacity constraints attenuated 
merger effects. Taking dynamic aspects of competition into account, Compte, Jenny, and Rey 
(2002) research effects of capacity constraints on mergers and collusion. Different from other 
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research about merger, Compte et al. (2002) captured the effects of asymmetric capacity 
constraints. van den Berg et al. (2012) discussed capacity constraints under the dynamic 
Cournot condition and considered the effects of comments on equilibrium while Froeb et al. 
(2003) and Roy Chowdhury (2009) analyse capacity constraints effects under the Bertrand 
competition. Those studies also show that capacity constraints induce industrial symmetry.
There are capacity constraints studies that focus specifically on service provider (Burkart, 
Klein, & Mayer, 2012), retail store (Murray, Gosavi, & Talukdar, 2012), air transportation 
(Chun & Park, 2016; Evans & Schäfer, 2011; Gelhausen, Berster, & Wilken, 2013) and sup-
ply chain (Mayer, Klein, & Seiermann, 2013; Wang & Dargahi, 2013). Genc and Reynolds 
(2011) identify how capacity constraints affect output equilibrium with wholesale elec-
tricity markets, and they find that capacity constraints result in symmetry, in other words, 
they obtain symmetric supply function equilibrium under capacity constraints. Inderst 
and Wambach (2001) analyse competitive insurance markets with limited capital. Heo 
et al. (2013) study the revenue management of the restaurant by highlighting the impacts 
of capacity constraints.
Capacity constraints is a key issue in industrial organisation theory as capacity constraints 
impact a firm’s output price, output quantity, output quality, and R&D. Both external and 
internal factors cause capacity constraints. However, almost all of the prior studies only 
capture external factors based on symmetric capacity constraints assumption. Many stud-
ies on capacity constraints have covered a specific industry, but few of them refer to the 
restaurant sector. The restaurant industry is unique in the sense that almost all individuals 
interact with the industry at some point in their life. On the one hand, capacity constraints 
are evident in the restaurant industry for they have a limited number of seats and business 
hours. On the other hand, capacity constraints are decided by internal factors and differ-
ent restaurants have different constraints. Considering these facts, this article highlights 
the impacts of capacity constraints to the quality competition of restaurant industry by 
employing an asymmetric capacity constraints model.
3. The model
Because of the low entry barrier, the restaurant industry operates in an almost perfectly 
competitive market. However, restaurants have horizontal differentiation for the different 
foods and services supplied by different restaurants and local specificity, which means 
restaurant competitions are imperfect. Game theory is generally used in imperfect com-
petition (see Chen & Nie, 2014; Chen et al., 2017; D’Aspremont & Jacquemin,1988; Wang, 
Nie, Peng, & Li, 2017), so we employ a two-stage Cournot game model.1 We classify con-
sumers into two types, price-sensitive and quality-sensitive, according to their preferences. 
We assume that there are small and large restaurants, and they compete with asymmetric 
capacity constraints.
It is possible that both restaurants have the two kinds of consumers, but an acceptable 
assumption is that consumers of the small restaurant are price-sensitive, while consumers 
of the larger ones are quality-sensitive.2 A restaurant operating with capacity constraints 
will be not able to make output decisions by the first order condition of maximising profit. 
As a rational economic entity, the restaurant operator will make great efforts to minimise 
loss by modifying the competitive situation. Besides quantity, the two other major endog-
enous variables are price and quality. Although the easiest way to increase profit is to raise 
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the price, price strategy has something to do with demand elasticity. Compared to a large 
restaurant, a small restaurant has larger demand elasticity, which means increasing prices 
will result in greater loss of consumers and decreases in gross profits. Contrarily, quality 
compromise will be met by consumer complaints about the large restaurant. Furthermore, 
a large restaurant has more fixed costs, which also leads the restaurant owner to charge 
higher prices when faced with capacity constraints.3 As a result, to increase its profits, a 
small restaurant will reduce quality, while a large restaurant will raise prices under the 
condition of capacity constraints.
Denote the small restaurant as restaurant 1 and the large restaurant as restaurant 2. The 
two restaurants compete with quantity as well as quality, and both quantity and quality 
impact consumer surplus (CS).
Given the quantity q = (q1, q2) and qualityx = (x1, x2), similar to Nie and Chen (2012) 
and Chen, Wen, and Luo (2016), this study employs consumer utility function as follows:
 
Equation (1) shows that consumers’ utility is dependent on both quantity and quality; Consumer 
utility will increase as the increase of quantity with a decrease speed, while it will increase as the 
increase of quality with an increase speed. Equation (1) is a common consumer utility function in 
economics, which is concave in qi and has its maximum value. Besides, inverse demand function 
can be obtained by function easily. α is a constant. β represent the basic reputation and τ is the 
reputation difference between the two types of restaurant. There are limits for the parameter of 
benchmark reputation, or 𝛽 < 𝛽 < 𝛽. Constrained by the cost function of the firms, β should 
be not too small.4 If reputation parameter (β) is too small, then the restaurant has no incentive 
to make a quality improvement because quality improvement also increases cost. Reputation 
parameters cannot be too high, as this gives too low or negative equilibrium quantity, since 
better reputation means higher price. Similar to Wang et al. (2017), a good reputation enables a 
firm to charge higher prices. To simplify our study, we fix the reputation parameter of the small 
restaurant to 5
2
, so we can focus our attention on the reputation difference.5 Then the CS function 
can be rewritten as follows:
 
Furthermore, we assume 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏 , which means the reputation of the large restaurant 
is higher than that of the small one, but reputation difference also has its limit. If not, the 
disadvantaged restaurant will be forced to quit the market. In addition, 0 < 𝛾 < 1
3
 indicates 
products substitutability of the two restaurants.6 Equation (2) shows that a representative 
CS function is concave in quantity and from (2) we obtain inverse-demand functions of 
the two restaurants by taking the derivative with respect to qi :
 
The total costs of both small and large restaurants are a function of quantity and quality.
 
(1)U(qi, xi) = ( + x1)q1 +
[

























p1 =  +
5
2
x1 − q1 − q2,
p2 =  + (
5
2







x2i + qixi i = (1, 2) .
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The first and second terms represent the costs result from quantity and quality investment, 
respectively. The last term captures the interaction of quantity and quality investment.7 
Both restaurants operate with capacity constraints, or the products and services q a res-
taurant can supply are less than a certain boundary R (or q ≤ R). Furthermore, we assume 
two restaurants compete with asymmetric capacity constraints, or the capacity of the small 
restaurant is less while the large restaurant has more capacity in general (q1 ≤ R1, q2 ≤ R2). 
Then, the objective functions of the two restaurants are given as follows:
 
R1 and R2 are the capacity constraints of the two restaurants and R1 < R2. Equation (5) is 
a dynamic model, which means two restaurants play a two-stage dynamic game. Both of 
them make quality-related decision at the first stage and then choose their optimal quantity 
at the second stage. All the solutions are obtained by backward induction.
4. Model analysis
Here, we will analyse the base model under four cases: restaurants compete without capacity 
constraints, a small restaurant with capacity constraints, a large restaurant with capacity 
constraints, and both of them with capacity constraints. We denote the first order optimum 
solutions of the two restaurants as q∗1 and q
∗
2.
Case 1 Assume there are no capacity constraints (or R1 ≥ q
∗
1 ,R2 ≥ q
∗
2). Solving function 
(5) we get the outputs of the two restaurants, which are the functions of quality investments.
 
Substituting Equation (6) to function (5) and differentiating by the quality, we obtain the 
optimal quality of the two restaurants:
 
And then substituting equations (7) to (6), this study achieves the final representation of 
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st. q1 ≤ R1
max
q2,x2
2 = [ + ( +
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st. q2 ≤ R2
(6)
q1 =









2(18 + 2)[9(9 − 8 − 42) − (3 + )(15 + 2) + 43]
729(9 − 8 − 42) − 272(165 − 24 − 202) + 94(65 + 2) − 166
,
x*2 =
2(18 + 18 + 2)(81 − 45 − 152 + 43)
729(9 − 8 − 42) − 272(165 − 24 − 202) + 94(65 + 2) − 166
.
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Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Reputation difference of the advantaged restaurant stimulates its quality that 
deters quality improvement by its competitor. That is obvious because reputation advantage 
means high marginal profits from the quality investment. More importantly, the larger the 
reputation difference, the more the total quality investment of the industry. In other words, 
the quality increase of the large restaurant is more than the quality decrease of the small 
one. The second part of Proposition 1 indicates product substitutability decreases both 
restaurants’ quality. In short, the conclusions of Proposition 1 show that product difference 
is helpful for quality improvement.
















Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 is almost the same as Proposition 1.
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Remarks: Reputation difference also decreases the outputs of the disadvantaged restaurant. 
However, just as the reputation difference raises total quality, it increases total outputs at 
the same time. Reputation difference equals to product difference. Proposition 1 along with 
Proposition 2 imply that consumers benefit from product differentiation as it increases 
equilibrium quality and quantity.
Case 2: We consider conditions q1 = R1 < q
∗
1 and R2 ≥ q
∗
2, which mean only the price-sen-
sitive (or small) restaurant meets capacity constraints. Under this condition, outputs of the 
constrained restaurant have nothing to do with its quality as it is an exogenous variable. 
Contrarily, the constrained restaurant makes a quality decision according to its capac-
ity constraints. Equilibrium quality and quantity solutions of the large restaurant can be 
obtained by backward induction:
 
 








Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: the former part of Lemma 1 implies that reputation difference of the advantage 
restaurant should not be too large, or it will have no incentive to make a quality investment. 
(8)
q∗1 =
(45 − 42)[9(9 − 8 − 42) + (3 + )(15 + 2 − 43)]
729(9 − 8 − 42) − 272(165 − 24 − 202) + 94(65 + 2) − 166
,
q∗2 =
(45 − 42 + 6)(81 − 45 − 152 + 43)
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 − 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3 − 12 − 42
)
.
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On the other hand, larger τ requires lower γ. The latter part of Lemma 1 guarantees capacity 
constraints of the small restaurant is efficient.













> 0, 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏










Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Capacity increase of the small restaurant reduces the quantity as well as quality 
of the large restaurant. Interestingly, capacity increase of the small restaurant improves the 
total quality investment of the industry when reputation advantage of the large restaurant is 
small. In contrast, capacity increase of the small restaurant decreases the total quality of the 
industry if the large restaurant has obvious reputation advantage (or τ is large). The capacity 
increase has competition effect for it reduces the quality and quantity of the competitor. 
However, the positive effect of capacity increase of the small restaurant will be offset by the 
negative effect of reputation disadvantage, which explains why the total quality decreases 
as the capacity of the small restaurant increases, when the large restaurant competes with 
large reputation advantage.
Case 3 If the quality-sensitive (or large) restaurant is faced with capacity constraints or 
q1 = R1 ≥ q
∗
1 and q2 = R2 < q
∗
2, then the output of the large restaurant is an exogenous 




Using the same reasoning as Lemma 1, we have Lemma 2:




Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Similar to Lemma 1, capacity constraints of the large restaurant also has its upper 
















Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Similar to Proposition 3, Proposition 4 shows the increase in the capacity of the 
large restaurant decreases the quality and output of the small restaurant. So, the conclu-
sions of Propositions 3 and 4 imply capacity increase of the constrained restaurant reduces 
the quality and output of the non-constrained competitor. But capacity increase of the 
large restaurant always increase the quality of the whole industry. In other words, a quality 
increase of the large restaurant involved by its capacity is larger than the quality decrease of 
the small restaurant. Furthermore, equations (11) and (12) show the reputation difference 
has no effect on the quality and quantity of the small restaurant. In contrast to Proposition 
3, Proposition 4 illustrates the effects of capacity constraints of the large restaurant have 
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Case 4 If both restaurants have capacity constraints, or q1 = R1 < q
∗
1 and q2 = R2 < q
∗
2, then 
we have the following solutions of the two restaurants in the equilibrium:
 
 
Interestingly, if both restaurants are confronted with capacity constraints, their quality 
investments are independent of their competitors’ capacity, and only their own capacity 
impacts their quality, which is distinct from all the other conditions. Comparing the total 
quality investment of the four cases, we get:
























































Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Remarks: Proposition 5 provides total quality investment comparisons among the four 
cases. Quality is the lowest under the condition that both restaurants have capacity con-
straints. Quality at Case 3 is more than Case 4 but less than Case 1. Surprisingly, quality 
investments at Case 2 are the highest among the four cases. A credible reason is that monop-
oly is conducive to quality innovation because capacity constraints of the small restaurant 
enhance the monopoly of the large one, which gives the large restaurant more incentives 
to make a quality investment.
Proposition 6 Under the condition that both restaurants are faced with capacity constraints, 
a price-sensitive restaurant lowers its quality while a quality-sensitive restaurant raises its 
price.
Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: A small restaurant cannot increase its prices as most of its consumers are 
price-sensitive, or the consumers will choose the large restaurant. But the decrease in quality 
investment lowers its costs. So, the rational choice of the small restaurant is to cut down 
its quality investment. Because decreasing quality improves profits by reducing costs. The 
conclusions of Proposition 7 indicate that a new restaurant usually supplies high-quality 
food and service at the beginning to attract more customers. Once it draws enough loyal 
customers, it will lower its quality, stealthily. Contrastingly, quality provides larger res-
taurants with some advantages. The rational choice of the quality-sensitive restaurant is 
to raise its price for it cannot lower its quality.10 Interestingly, to make the clients accept a 
higher price, restaurants will tell them that the reason for the high price is that the prices 
of the inputs are higher. In other words, restaurants will use higher cost as an excuse for 
increasing its price under capacity constraints.
Next, we will discuss how capacity constraints impact SW. Let us denote Consumer 
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And function (14) implies the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 The relationships of CS as well as SW among different cases are 
CS∗,3 < CS∗,2 < CS∗ < CS∗,1 and SW∗,3 < SW∗,2 < SW∗ < SW∗,1.
Proof. See the appendix. ■
Remarks: Capacity constraints impact consumer surplus (CS) and social welfare (SW). 
Besides, capacity constraints of different restaurants have different effects. CS, as well as SW, 
is lowest under the condition that both restaurants face capacity constraints. Compared to 
benchmark, the Cournot competition (or no restaurants have capacity constraints), capacity 
constraints of the small restaurant decrease CS and SW, while capacity constraints of the 
large restaurant increase both CS and SW. If we regard capacity constraints of the small 
restaurant as an increase of the monopoly extent of the large restaurant, while capacity con-
straints of the large restaurant as an increase of competition, then Proposition 8 illustrates 
that people benefit from monopoly because monopoly improves CS and SW.
5. Conclusion
Generally speaking, capacity constraints are seen as a disadvantage for the constrained firms. 
But studies by Esó et al. (2010), Nie and Chen (2012) and Chen et al. (2015) illustrate that 
capacity constraints are beneficial to disadvantaged restaurants. Following their arguments, 
this article highlights the effects of capacity constraints on quality and quantity of the restau-
rant industry by classifying consumers into price-sensitive and quality-sensitive categories. 
Different from other studies, the capacity constraints of this article are asymmetric, which 
means different restaurants have different capacity constraints. Based on that assumption, 
our study shows that the capacity constraints of different restaurants (small restaurants vs 
large restaurants) have different effects.
We employ a two-stage dynamic Cournot competition model, which is quite common 
in the industrial organisation literature. The conclusion of this article shows that reputation 
difference increases total quality investments as well as total outputs at equilibrium. In other 
words, reputation difference improves CS and SW, which is different from the findings of 
Tirole (1988) because Tirole’s classical reputation theory shows that less reputation differ-
ence means fiercer competition and higher CS, as well as higher SW. Although capacity 
constraints decrease SW, they give restaurants a chance to improve their profits by increasing 
the price (quality-sensitive) or reducing the quality (price-sensitive). Therefore, it is not 
surprising if a restaurant increases price or decreases quality within a short time frame. 
Our conclusions are relevant to the health care industry and many other service industries 
if quality is an integral part of the competition dynamics, which means this study has the 
potential for broad applications in many industrial sectors, and it also makes a contribution 
towards an asymmetric capacity constraints theory.
(14)
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At the same time, this article compares the total quality investment, CS as well as SW 
among four cases. Results of this study show that total quality investment, CS, and SW are 
the lowest if both restaurants have capacity constraints. Interestingly, total quality invest-
ment, CS, and SW are the highest under the condition when only the small restaurant faces 
with capacity constraints. In other words, total quality investment, CS, and SW are not the 
highest if none of the restaurants face capacity constraints.
We set this study to explain restaurant competitions under the industrial organisation 
framework. A restaurant can cut down its quality or raise its price when confronted with 
capacity constraints. Both strategies have the obvious consequence of losing consumers. A 
more suitable choice is to relieve capacity constraints by merger. So, a restaurant may con-
sider merging with another to improve its gross profits when it is confronted with capacity 
constraints. Some assumptions of this study lack strong economic theories, but they are 
based on real phenomena. The natural extension of our study is to use empirical data to 
authenticate our theoretical conclusions. Besides, quality can also cause capacity constraints 
because high product quality has a high requirement for material inputs. A study focusing 
on capacity constraints can be expended by quality constraints. Another possibility is that 
some small restaurants focus on special food and offer high-quality food and service, so 
any further studies should also pay attention to this phenomenon.
There are three main research limitations for this article: First, we only consider the 
Cournot competition and ignore other market structure such as the Stackelberg competi-
tion; Second, this article only involves quantity input capacity constraints, but quality or 
both quantity and quality cause constraints. Third, we have not supplied experienced support 
in this research. All these limitations will be taken into consideration in future research.
Notes
1.  Different kinds of oligopoly models such as the Cournot model, the Hotelling model and the 
Stacklberg competition can also be applied to study duopoly competition, but the Cournot 
competition is the most suitable one for this study. Because the Stacklberg model is useful for 
the condition that products difference between different firms are small, or the disadvantaged 
one will be forced to exit the competition and the Hotelling model has an advantage in costs 
difference or transportation cost analyses.
2.  There are some exceptions, for example, some small restaurants take high quality strategy 
and they offer high quality food and services. But that are just special cases, so we ignore this 
type of special small restaurants in this study.
3.  There exists the condition that small restaurants have more fixed costs than larger restaurants, 
but fixed cost increases with firm size is a general conclusion in economics. Besides, we cannot 
consider all kinds of status or it will be too difficult to capture any valuable conclusions.
4.  From firms’ cost functions, it is known that β should be large enough to make 𝛽xiqi >
1
2
x2i + qixi. 
See cost functions of firms in the remaining sections of the article.
5.  β can be equal to 2 or another value, and which has little impact on the conclusions.
6.  As we assume two restaurants provide different product (or service), so products substitutability 
is small in this study. And the existence of τ means low products substitutability.
7.  This general cost function is widely used in economics studies, see D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988), Nie and Chen (2012), Chen et al. (2015, 2017) and Wang and Chen (2017).
8.  Our study shows that both of the upper bounds of capacity constraints decrease with 
substitutability, which means larger product substitutability has more limit to restaurant 
capacity.
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 are be obtained by numerical simulation, 
which are similar to the proof of Proposition 7 and we omit them here. For more details, 
please see the proof of Proposition 7.
10.  Price can be used as a signal for quality, especially in restaurant sector. Higher quality means 
higher reputation and higher price. So, a restaurant with higher quality has less motivation 
to lower its price because it operates with more opportunity cost or higher quality restaurant 
will lose more if it is bankruptcy for quality safety
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Proof of Proposition 6




2) in Case 1 and q
∗,3
i








− R1 − 𝛾R2 > p
∗










= x∗1. But as a price-sensitive 
restaurant, the small restaurant cannot raise its price which means the small restaurant should too 
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Figure 1. numerical simulation of CS∗,2 − CS∗,3. vertical axis is the value of CS∗,2 − CS∗,3, α = 100 and R1 = 44. 
source: caculated by mathematica 9.
Figure 2. numerical simulation of SW∗,2 − SW∗,3. vertical axis is the value of SW∗−SW∗,2, α = 100 and 
R2 = 47. source: caculated by mathematica 9.
keep the price, or p∗,3
1
= p∗1. So we have x
∗,3
1
< x∗1. For the quality-sensitive restaurant, it should hold 
its quality, or x∗,3
2




Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. ■
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7 is obtained by numerical simulation since the expression is very complex (see the 
following tables).
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Figure 3. numerical simulation of CS∗−CS∗,2. vertical axis is the value of CS∗−CS∗,2, α = 100 and R2 = 47. 
source: caculated by mathematica 9.
Figure 4. numerical simulation of SW∗−SW∗,2. vertical axis is the value of SW∗−SW∗,2, α = 100 and R2 = 47. 
source: caculated by mathematica 9.
Figure 5. numerical simulation of CS∗,1−CS∗. vertical axis is the value of CS∗,1−CS∗, α = 100 and R1 = 44. 
source: caculated by mathematica 9.
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Figure 6. numerical simulation of SW∗,1−SW∗. vertical axis is the value of SW∗,1−SW∗, α = 100 and R1 = 44. 
source: caculated by mathematica 9.
The results of Figures 1–6 are consistent with the conclusions of proposition 8. Conclusions are 
therefore achieved and the proof is complete.■
